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ABSTRACT
Modern web browsers are incredibly complex, with millions
of lines of code and over one thousand JavaScript functions
and properties available to website authors. This work inves-
tigates how these browser features are used on the modern,
open web. We find that JavaScript features differ wildly in
popularity, with over 50% of provided features never used in
the Alexa 10k.
We also look at how popular ad and tracking blockers
change the distribution of features used by sites, and identify
a set of approximately 10% of features that are disproportion-
ately blocked (prevented from executing by these extensions
at least 90% of the time they are used). We additionally find
that in the presence of these blockers, over 83% of available
features are executed on less than 1% of the most popular
10,000 websites.
We additionally measure a variety of aspects of browser
feature usage on the web, including how complex sites have
become in terms of feature usage, how the length of time a
browser feature has been in the browser relates to its usage
on the web, and how many security vulnerabilities have been
associated with related browser features.
1. INTRODUCTION
The web is the world’s largest open application platform.
While initially developed for simple document delivery, it
has grown to become the most popular way of delivering
applications to users. Along with this growth in popularity
has been a growth in complexity, as the web has picked up
more and more capabilities over time.
This growth in complexity has been guided by both browser
vendors and web standards. Many of these new web capa-
bilities are provided through new JavaScript APIs (referred
to in this paper as features). These features are organized
into collections of related features which are published as
part of standards documents (in this paper, we refer to these
collections of APIs as standards).
To maximize compatibility between websites and web
browsers, browser vendors rarely remove features from browsers.
Browser vendors aim to provide website authors with new
features without breaking sites that rely on older browser
features. The result is an ever growing set of features in the
browser.
Many web browser features have been controversial and
even actively opposed by privacy and free software activists
for imposing significant costs on users, in the form of infor-
mation leakage or loss of control. The WebRTC [9] standard
has been criticized for revealing users IP addresses [46], and
protestors have literally taken to the streets [47] to oppose
the Encrypted Media Extensions [15] standard. This stan-
dard aims to give content owners much more control over
how their content is experienced within the browser. Such
features could be used to prevent users from exerting control
over their browsing experience.
Similarly, while the complexity (measured as the number
of resources requested) is well understood [11], what is not
understood is how much of the functionality available in
the browser gets used, by which sites, how often, and for
what purpose. Several questions remain, including whether
recently introduced features are as popular as old features,
whether popular websites use different features than less pop-
ular sites, or how the use of popular site altering extensions,
like those that block advertisements and online tracking,
impact which browser features are used.
This paper answers those questions by examining the uti-
lization of browser features on the web. By examining the
JavaScript feature usage of the ten thousand most popular
sites on the web, we measured which browser features are
frequently used by site authors, and which browser features
are rarely used on the web. We find, for example, that 50%
of the JavaScript provided features in the web browser are
never used by the top ten thousand most popular websites.
Ad and tracking blocking extensions are a common way
that users modify their web browsing experience. We addi-
tionally measure the utilization of browser features under
these blockers to determine the change in browser feature
usage when users install these popular extensions. We find
that installing advertising and tracking blocking extensions
not only unsurprisingly reduces the amount of JavaScript
users execute when browsing the web, but changes the kinds
of features their browsers execute; we identify a substantial
set of browser features (approximately 10%) that are used by
websites, but which ad and tracking blockers prevent from
executing more than ninety percent of the time. Similarly,
we find that over 83% of features available in the browser
are executed on less than 1% of websites in the presence of
popular advertising and tracking blocking extensions.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss the complexity of the modern
web browser, along with the use of ad and tracking blockers.
2.1 Modern Web Features
The complexity of modern web browsers has grown to
encompass countless potential use cases. While the core
functionality embodied by the combination of HTML, CSS,
and JavaScript is largely stable, over the past few years,
ar
X
iv
:1
60
5.
06
46
7v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 20
 M
ay
 20
16
010
20
30
40
0
5
10
15
W
eb Standards
M
illion LO
C
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Chrome
Firefox
Safari
IE
Figure 1: Feature families and lines of code in popular
browsers over time.
many features have been added to provide for new use cases.
Figure 1 shows the number of standards available in modern
browsers, using data from W3C documents [60] and Can
I Use [14]. Figure 1 also shows the total number of lines
of code for Firefox and Chrome [10]. One relevant point
of note in the figure is that in mid 2013, Google moved
to the Blink rendering engine, which entailed removing at
least 8.8 million lines of code from Chrome related to the
formerly-used WebKit engine [34].
Vendors are very wary of removing features from the
browser, even if they are used by a very small fraction of all
websites [1, 2]. Because the web is evolving and competing
with native applications, browser vendors are incentivized to
continue adding new features to the web browser and not re-
move old features. This is exacerbated by browsers typically
having a unified code base across different types of computers
including mobile devices, browser-based computers such as
Google Chromebooks, and traditional personal computers.
Browser vendors then expose unique hardware capabilities
like webcams, rotation sensors, vibration motors, or ambient
light sensors [30, 31, 33, 54] directly through JavaScript, re-
gardless of whether the executing device has such a capability.
Furthermore, as new features are added, the current best
practice is to roll them out directly to web developers as
time limited experiments, and allow them to move directly
from experimental features to standard features, available in
all browsers that adhere to the HTML living standard. [48].
Individual websites are also quite complex. Butkiewicz et
al. surveyed 2000 random websites and found that loading
the base page for a URL required fetching a median of 40
objects, and that 50% of websites fetched at least 6 Javascript
objects [11].
2.2 Ads and Tracking Blocking
Researchers have previously investigated how people use
ad blockers. Pujol et al. measured AdBlock usage in the
wild, discovering that while a significant fraction of very
active web users use AdBlock, most users primarily use its
ad blocking, and not its privacy preserving, features [44].
User tracking is a more insidious aspect of the modern web.
Recent work by Radler found that users were much less aware
of cross-website tracking than they were about collection of
data by single sites such as Facebook and Google, and that
users who were aware of it had greater concerns about un-
wanted access to private information than those who weren’t
aware [45]. Tracking users’ web browsing activity across
websites is largely unregulated, and a complex network of
mechanisms and businesses have sprung up to provide a vari-
ety of services in this space [17]. Krishnamurthy and Willis
found that aggregation of user-related data is both growing
and becoming more concentrated, i.e. being conducted by a
smaller number of companies [32].
Traditionally, tracking was done via client-side cookies, giv-
ing users a measure of control over how much they are tracked
(i.e. they can always delete cookies). However, a wide variety
of non-cookie tracking measures have been developed that
take this control away from users, and these are what track-
ing blockers have been designed to prevent. These include
browser fingerprinting [16], JavaScript fingerprinting [37, 40],
Canvas fingerprinting [38], clock skew fingerprinting [29],
history sniffing [27], cross origin timing attacks [55], ever-
cookies [28], and Flash cookie respawning [7, 49]. A variety
of these tracking behaviors have been observed in widespread
use in the wild [3, 7, 36, 41, 42, 49, 50].
Especially relevant to our work is the use of JavaScript
APIs for tracking. While some APIs, such as Beacon [20], are
designed specifically for tracking, other APIs were designed
to support various other functionality and co-opted into
behaving as trackers [38, 59]. Balebako et al. evaluated tools
which purport to prevent tracking and found that blocking
add-ons were effective [8].
3. DATA SOURCES
This work draws on several existing sets of data. This sec-
tion proceeds by detailing how we determined which websites
are more popular and how often they are visited, how we
determined the current JavaScript-exposed feature set of a
modern web browser, what web standard those features be-
long to and when they were introduced, how we determined
the known vulnerabilities in the web browser (and which
browser feature standard the vulnerability was associated
with), and which browser plugins we used as representative
of common browser modifications.
3.1 Alexa Website Rankings
The Alexa rankings are a well known ordering of websites
ranked by traffic. Typically, research which uses Alexa relies
on their ranked list of the worldwide top one million sites.
However, Alexa exposes more data about these sites through
their API. In addition to a global ranking of each of these
sites, there are also local rankings at country granularity,
breakdowns of which subsites (by fully qualified domain
name) are most popular, and a breakdown by page load and
by unique visitor of how many monthly visitors each site
gets.
We use the Alexa rankings to determine the 10,000 most
popular sites, which collectively represent approximately one
third of all web visits.
3.2 Web API Features
We define a feature as a browser capability that is acces-
sible through a JavaScript function call or property setting.
We determined the set of JavaScript-exposed browser fea-
tures by reviewing the WebIDL definitions included in the
Firefox version 46.0.1 source code. WebIDL is a language
that defines the JavaScript features web browsers provide to
web authors. In the case of Firefox, these WebIDL files are
included as text documents in the browser source.
In the common case, Firefox’s WebIDL files define a map-
ping between a JavaScript accessible method or property and
the C++ code that implements the underlying functionality
in the browser1. We examined each of the 757 WebIDL files
in the Firefox and extracted 1,392 relevant methods and
properties implemented in the browser.
3.3 Web API Standards
Web standards are documents defining functionality that
web browser vendors should implement. They are generally
written and formalized by organizations like the W3C, though
occasionally standards organizations delegate responsibility
for writing standards to third parties, such as the Khronos
group (who maintains the current WebGL standard).
Web API standards are a collection of one or more Web
API features, generally designed to be used together. For ex-
ample, the WebAudio API [4] standard defines 52 JavaScript
APIs that together allow page authors to do programmatic
sound synthesis.
While there are web standards that cover many aspects of
the web (such as parsing rules, what tags and attributes can
be used in HTML documents, etc.) this work focuses only on
web standards that define JavaScript exposed functionality.
Web API standards documents enumerate the WebIDL
endpoints that are part of each standard. We identified 74
standards implemented in Firefox. We associated each of
the 1,392 features we identified to one of these standards.
We also found 65 API endpoints implemented in Firefox
that are not found in any web standard document, which we
associated with a catch-all Non-Standard categorization.
In the case of some extremely large standards we iden-
tify sub-standards, which define a subset of related features
intended to be used together. For example, we treat the sub-
sections of the HTML standard that define the basic Canvas
API, or the WebSockets API, as their own standards.
Because these sub-standards have their own coherent pur-
pose, it is meaningful to discuss them independently of their
parent standards. Furthermore, many have historically been
implemented in browsers independent of the parent standard
(i.e. browser vendors added support for “websockets” long
before they implement support for the current full “HTML5”
standard.
Some features appear in multiple web standards. For ex-
1In addition to mapping JavaScript to C++ methods and
structures, WebIDL can also define JavaScript to JavaScript
methods, as well as intermediate structures that are not ex-
posed to the browser. In practice though, the primary role of
WebIDL in Firefox is to define a mapping between JavaScript
API endpoints and the underlying implementations, generally
in C++.
ample, the Node.prototype.insertBefore feature appears
in the Document Object Model (DOM) Level 1 Specifica-
tion [6], Document Object Model (DOM) Level 2 Core Spec-
ification [23] and Document Object Model (DOM) Level 3
Core Specification [24] standards. In such cases, we attribute
the feature to the earliest published standard.
3.4 Historical Firefox Builds
We determined when features were implemented in Firefox
by examining the 186 versions of Firefox that have been
released since 2004 and testing when each of the 1,392 features
we identified in the current version Firefox first appeared.
We treat the release date of the earliest verison of Firefox
that a feature appears in as the feature’s “implementation
date”.
Most standards do no have a single implementation date,
since it could take months or years for a standard to be fully
implemented in Firefox. We therefore treat the introduc-
tion of a standard’s currently most popular feature as the
standard’s implementation date. For ties (especially relevant
when no feature in a standard is used), we default to the
earliest feature available.
3.5 CVEs
We collected information about browser vulnerabilities
and security bugs by finding all Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVEs) [53] (security-relevant bugs discovered in
software) related to the Firefox web browser that had been
documented in the last three years.
The CVE database lists 470 issues from the last three
years that mention Firefox. On manual inspection we found
that 14 of these were not actually issues in Firefox, but
issues in other web-related software where Firefox was used
to demonstrate the vulnerability.
Of the remaining 456 CVEs, we were able to manually as-
sociate 111 CVEs with a specific web standard. For example,
CVE-2013-0763 [51] describes a potential remote execution
vulnerability introduced in Firefox’s implementation of the
WebGL [26] standard, and CVE-2014-1577 [52] documents
a potential information-disclosing bug related to Firefox’s
implementation of the Web Audio API standard.
3.6 Blocking Extensions
Finally, this work pulls from commerical and crowd-sourced
browser extensions, which are popularly used to modify the
browser environment in a way that the user prefers.
This work relies on two such browser extensions, Ghostery
and AdBlock Plus. Ghostery is a browser extension that
allows users to increase their privacy online by modifying
their browser to not load resources or set cookies associated
with cross-domain passive tracking, as determined by the
extension’s maintainer, Ghostery, Inc..
This work also uses the AdBlock Plus browser extension,
which modifies the browser to both not load resources the
extension associates with advertising, as well as to hide
elements in the page that are advertising related. This
extension draws from a crowdsourced list of rules and URLs
that the extension uses to determine whether a resource is
advertising-related.
4. METHODOLOGY
To understand browser feature usage on the web, we con-
ducted a survey of the Alexa 10k, visiting each site ten
times and recording which browser features were utilized.
We visited each site five times with an unmodified browsing
environment, and five times with popular tracking-blocking
and advertising-blocking extensions installed. This section
proceeds by describing the goals of this survey, followed by
how we instrumented the web browser to determine which
features are used on a given site, and then concludes with
how we used our instrumented browser to measure feature
usage on the web.
4.1 Goals
The goal of our automated survey is to take a cross section
of the web as it is commonly experienced by users, and to
determine which browser features are used in those websites.
This requires us to take a broad-yet-representative sample of
the web, and to exhaustively determine the functionalities
most commonly used on those sites.
To do so, we built a browser extension to measure which
features are used when a user interacts with a website. We
then chose a representative sample of the web to visit. Finally,
we developed a method for interacting with these sites in
an automated fashion to elicit the same functionality that
a human web user would experience. Each of these steps is
described in further detail in the proceeding subsections.
This automated approach only attempts to measure the
“open web”, or the subset of webpage functionality that a
user encounters without logging into a website. Users may
encounter different types of functionality when interacting
with websites that they have created accounts for and estab-
lished relationships with, but such measurements are beyond
the scope of this paper.
4.2 Measuring Extension
We instrumented a recent version of the Firefox web
browser (version 46.0.1) with a custom browser extension
which records each time a JavaScript feature has been used
on a visited page. Our extension injects JavaScript into each
page after the browser has created the DOM for that page,
and before any of the page’s content has been loaded. By
injecting this JavaScript into the beginning of the <head>
element, we can modify those methods and properties com-
prising the DOM before it becomes available to the JavaScript
of the requested page.
The JavaScript that the extension injects into each re-
quested page modifies the DOM to count each instance an
instrumented method is called or that an instrumented prop-
erty is written. How the extension measures these method
calls and property writes is detailed in the following two
subsections. Figure 2 presents a representative diagram of
the crawling process.
4.2.1 Measuring Method Calls
The browser extension counts method invocations by over-
writing each method on the defining element’s prototype.
This approach allows us to shim in our own logging func-
tionality for each method call, and then call the original
method to preserve the original functionality. This replaces
each reference to the DOM’s methods with the extension’s
instrumented version.
We also take advantage of closures in JavaScript to ensure
that web pages are not able to bypass the instrumented
versions of each method by looking up–or otherwise directly
accessing–the original versions of each DOM method.
1 Each browser requests
the selected page
Proxy injects hooks at
beginning of <head>
2
Gremlins interact,
extension records
3
blocking,example.com,Crypto.getRandomValues(),1
blocking,example.com,Node.cloneNode(),10
default,example.com,Crypto.getRandomValues(),1
default,example.com,Node.cloneNode(),4
Figure 2: One iteration of the feature invocation measure-
ment process.
4.2.2 Measuring Property Writes
Properties were more difficult to record. JavaScript pro-
vides no way to intercept whether a property has been set or
read on a client script-created object, or on an object created
after the instrumenting code has finished executing. However,
through the use of the non-standard Object.watch()[39]
method available in Firefox, we were able to capture property-
setting events on one of the singleton objects in the browser
(e.g. window, window.document, window.navigator). Using
this Object.watch() method allowed the extension to cap-
ture and count all writes to properties on singleton objects
in the DOM.
4.2.3 Other Browser Features
Web standards define other features in the browser too,
such as events and CSS layout rules, selectors, and instruc-
tions. However, our extension-based approach did not allow
us to measure the use of these features, and so counts of
their use are not included in this work.
In the case of standard defined browser events, the ex-
tension could have captured some event registrations by
combination of watching which events were registered to
addEventListener method calls, and watching for property-
sets to singleton objects. However, we would not have been
able to capture event registrations using the legacy DOM0
method of event registration (e.g. assigning a function to
an object’s onclick property to handle click events) on non-
singleton objects. Since we would only have been able to see
a subset of event registrations, we decided to omit events
from this work.
Similarly, this work does not consider non-JavaScript ex-
posed functionality defined in the browser, such as CSS
selectors and rules. While interesting, this work focuses
solely on functionality that the browser allows JavaScript
authors to access.
4.3 Eliciting Site Functionality
Using our feature-detecting browser extension, we were
able to measure which browser features are used on the 10k
most popular websites. The following subsections describe
how we simulated human interaction with web pages to cap-
ture the features that would be executed when users visited
these sites, first with the browser in its default state, and
again with the browser modified with popular advertisting-
and-tracking blocking extensions.
4.3.1 Default Case
To understand which features are necessary for a site’s ex-
ecution, we perform dynamic analysis on live running pages
in Firefox while using the measuring extension described in
Section 4.2. The goal is to exercise as much of the function-
ality built into the page as possible. While some JavaScript
features of a site are automatically activated on the home
page, like advertisements and analytics, many features will
only be used as a result of user interaction either within the
page or by navigating to different areas of the site. Here we
explain our strategy for crawling and interacting with sites.
In order to trigger as many browser features as possible on
a website, we used a common site testing methodology called
“monkey testing”. Monkey testing refers to the strategy of
instrumenting a page to click, touch, scroll, and enter text
on random elements or locations on the page. To accomplish
this, we use a modified version of gremlins.js [61], a library
built for monkey testing front-end website interfaces.
We started our measurement by visiting the home page
of each site and allowing the monkey testing to run for
30 seconds. Because the randomness of monkey testing
could cause navigation to other domains, we intercepted
and prevented any interactions which might navigate to a
different page. For navigations that would have been to the
local domain, we noted which URLs the browser would have
visited in the absence of the interception.
We then proceeded in a breadth first search of the site’s
hierarchy using the URLs that would have been visited by
the actions of the monkey testing. We then selected 3 of these
URLs that were on the same domain (or related domain, as
determined by the Alexa data), and visited each, repeating
the same 30 second monkey testing procedure and recording
all used features. From each of these 3 sites, we then visited
three more pages for 30 seconds, which resulted in a total of
13 pages interacted with for a total of 390 seconds per site.
If more than three links were clicked during any stage of
the monkey testing process, we selected which URLs to visit
by giving preference to URLs where the directory structure
of the URL had not been previously seen. In contrast to
traditional interface fuzzing techniques which have as a goal
finding unintended or malicious functionality [5, 35], we
were interested in finding all functionalities that users will
commonly interact with. By selecting URLs with different
path-segments, we try to visit as many different types of
pages on the site as possible, with the goal of capturing all
of the functionality on the site that a user would encounter.
These properties of our strategy are evaluated in Section 6.
4.3.2 Blocking Case
In addition to the default case measurements described in
Section 4.3.1, we also re-ran the same measurements against
the Alexa 10k with an ad blocker (AdBlockPlus) and a
tracking-blocker (Ghostery) to generate a second, ‘blocking’,
set of measurements. We include these blocking measure-
ments as being representative of the types of modifications
users make to customize their browsing experience. While
this version of a site no longer represents its author’s in-
tended representation (and may in fact break the site), the
popularity of these content blocking extensions lends cre-
dence to the blocking case being a valid alternative method
of experiencing a given website.
4.3.3 Automated Crawl
Domains measured 9,733
Total website interaction time 480 days
Web pages visited 2,240,484
Feature invocations recorded 21,511,926,733
Table 1: Amount of data gathered regarding JavaScript
feature usage on the Alexa 10k. “Total website interaction
time” is an estimate based on the number of pages visited
and 30 seconds of page interaction per visit.
For each site in the Alexa 10k, we repeated the above
procedure ten times to ensure we measure all features used
on the page, five times in the default case, and 5 time in
the blocking case. We present findings for why 5 times is
sufficient to induce all types of site functionality in Section 6.
Table 1 presents some high level figures of this automated
crawl. For 267 domains, were unable to measure feature usage
for a variety of reasons, including non-responsive domains
and sites that contained syntax errors in their JavaScript
code that prevented execution.
5. RESULTS
In this section we discuss our findings, including the popu-
larity distribution of JavaScript features used on the web with
and without blocking, feature popularity’s relation to fea-
ture age, which features are disproportionately blocked, and
which features are associated with security vulnerabilities.
5.1 Definitions
This work uses the term feature popularity to denote
the percentage of sites that use a given feature at least once
during automated interaction with the site. A feature that is
used on every site has a popularity of 1, and a feature that
is never seen has a popularity of 0.
Similarly, we use the term standard popularity to de-
note the percentage of sites that use at least one feature from
the standard at least once during the site’s execution.
Finally, we use the term block rate to denote how fre-
quently a browser feature would have been used if not for the
presence of an advertisement- or tracking-blocking extension.
In other words, browser features that are used much less
frequently on the web when a user has AdBlock Plus or
Ghostery installed have high block rates, while features that
are still used on roughly the same number of websites in the
presence of blocking extensions have low block rate.
5.2 Standard Popularity Distribution
Figure 3 displays the cumulative distribution of standard
popularity. Some standards are extremely popular, and
others are extremely unpopular: six standards are used on
over 90% of all websites measured, and a full 28 of the 75
standards measured were used on 1% or fewer sites, with
eleven not used at all. Standard popularity is not feast or
famine however, as standards see several different popularity
levels between those two extremes.
5.3 Feature Popularity
We find that browser standards are not equally used on
the web. Some features are extremely popular, such as the
Document.prototype.createElement method, which allows
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of standard popularity
within the Alexa 10k.
for client-side modification of webpages and is used on 9,079–
or over 90%–of pages in the Alexa 10k.
Other browser features are never used. For example, 689
features, or almost 50% of the 1,392 implemented in the
browser, are never used once in the 10k most popular sites.
A further 416 features are used on less than 1% of the 10k
most popular websites. Put together, this means that over
79% of the features available in the browser are used by less
than 1% of the web.
We also find that browser features do not have equal
block rates; some features are blocked by advertisement and
tracking blocking extensions far more often than others. 10%
of browser features are prevented from executing over 90%
of the time when browsing with common blocking extensions.
We also find that 1,159 features, or over 83% of features
available in the browser, are executed on less than 1% of
websites in the presence of popular advertising and tracking
blocking extensions.
5.4 Standard Popularity in the Alexa 10k
Standards, sets of related browser features collected and
standardized together, are not equally popular on the web.
Figure 4 depicts the relationship between a standards’s pop-
ularity (represented by the number of sites the standard was
used on, log scale) and its block rate. Since a standard’s pop-
ularity is the number of sites where a feature in a standard
appears at least once, the popularity of the standard will be
equal to at least the popularity of the most popular feature
in the standard.
Each quadrant of the graph tells a different story about
the popularity and desirability of a standard on the web.
Popular, Unblocked Standards. The upper-left quadrant con-
tains the standards that occur very frequently on the web,
and are rarely blocked by advertising and tracking blocking
extensions.
One example of this, point CSS-OM, depicts the CSS
Object Model [43] standard, which allows JavaScript code
to introspect, modify and add to the styling rules in the
document. It is positioned near the top of the graph because
8,193 sites used a feature from the standard at least once
during measurement. The standard is positioned to the
left of the graph because the standard has a low block rate
(12.6%), meaning that the addition of blocking extensions
had relatively little effect on how frequently a site used any
feature from the standard.
Popular, Blocked Standards. The upper-right quadrant of
the graph shows standards that are used by a large percentage
of sites on the web, but which blocking extensions frequently
prevent from executing.
A representative example of such a standard is the HTML:
Channel Messaging [21] standard, represented by point H-
CM. This standard defines JavaScript methods allowing
embedded documents (iframes) and windows to communi-
cate with their parent document. This functionality is often
used by embedded-content and popup windows to communi-
cate with the hosting page, often in the context of advertising.
This standard is used on over half of all sites by default, but
is prevented from being executed over 77% of the time.
Unpopular, Blocked Standards. The lower-right quadrant of
the graph shows standards that are rarely used by websites,
and that are almost always prevented from executing by
blocking extensions.
Point ALS shows the Ambient Light Events standard [54],
which defines events and methods allowing a website to react
to changes to the level of light the computer, laptop or mobile
phone is exposed to. The standard is rarely used on the web
(14 out of 10k sites), but is prevented from being executed
100% of the time by blocking extensions.
Unpopular, Unblocked Standards. The lower-left quadrant of
the graph shows standards that were rarely seen in our study,
but which were rarely prevented from executing. Point E
shows the Encodings [56] standard. This standard allows
JavaScript code to read and convert text between different
text encodings, such as reading text from a document encoded
in GBK and inserting it into a website encoded in UTF-8.
The Encodings [56] standard is rarely used on the web,
with only 1 of the Alexa 10k sites attempting to use it.
However, the addition of an advertising or tracking blocking
extension had no affect on the number of times the standard
was used; this sole site still used the Encodings standard
although AdBlock Plus and Ghostery were installed.
5.5 Standard Popularity by Site Popularity
The results described in this paper treat all sites in the
Alexa 10k equally, so that if the most popular and least pop-
ular sites use the same standard, both uses of that standard
are given equal consideration. In this section we examine the
accuracy of this assumption by measuring the difference be-
tween the number of sites using a standard, and the number
of website visits using a standard. In other words, we weigh
a standard’s use based on the popularity of the site using it.
Figure 5 shows the results of this comparison. The x-axis
shows the percentage of sites examined that use at least one
feature from a standard, and the y-axis shows the estimated
percentage of site views on the web that use this standard.
Standards above the x=y line are more popular on frequently
visited sites, such that the percentage of page views using
the standard is greater than the percentage of sites using the
AJAX
ALS
BA BE
CO
CSS−CR
CSS−FO
CSS−OM
CSS−VM
DO
DOM
DOM1
DOM2−C
DOM2−E
DOM2−H
DOM2−S
DOM2−T
DOM3−C
DOM3−X
DOM4
DOM−PS
DU
E
EC
EME
F
FA
FULL
GEO
GIM
GP
H−B
H−C
H−CM
H−HI
H−P
HRTHTML HTML5
HTML51
H−WB
H−WS
H−WW
IDB
MCD
MCS
MSE
MSR
NS
NT
PE
PL
PT
PT2
PV
RT
SD
SEL
SLC
SO
SVG
SW
TC
TPE
UIE
URL
UTL
V
WCR
WEBA
WEBGL
WEBVTT
WN
WRTC
10
100
1,000
10,000
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Block rate
Si
te
s 
us
in
g 
th
is 
st
an
da
rd
Figure 4: Popularity of standards versus their block rate, on a log scale.
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Figure 5: Comparison of percentage of sites using a standard
versus percentage of web traffic using a standard.
standard.
Generally, the graph shows that standard usage is not
equally distributed, and that some standards are more popu-
lar with more frequently visited sites. However, the general
trend appears to be for standards to cluster around the x=y
line, indicating that while there are some differences in stan-
dard usage between popular and less popular sites, they do
not affect our general analysis of standard usage on the web.
Therefore, for the sake of brevity and simplicity, all other
measures in this paper treat standard usage on all domains
as equal, and do not factor a site’s popularity into the mea-
surement.
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Figure 6: Comparison of a standard’s availability date, and
its popularity.
5.6 Standard Popularity by Introduction Date
We were also able to measure the relationship between
when a standard became available in the browser, its popular-
ity, and how frequently its execution is prevented by popular
blocking extensions. Again, to simplify the presentation, the
graph illustrates the popularity, introduction date, and block
rate of standards; not of the individual features themselves
that comprise these standards.
As the graph shows, there is no simple relationship between
when a standard was added to the browser, how frequently
the standard is used on the web today, and how frequently
the standard is blocked by common blocking extensions.
However, as Figure 6 indicates, some standards have become
extremely popular over time, while others, both recent and
old, have languished in disuse. Further, it appears that some
standards have been introduced extremely recently but have
nevertheless been readily adopted by web authors.
Old, Popular Standards. For example, point AJAX depicts
the XMLHttpRequest [57], or AJAX standard, used to to
send information to a server without refetching the entire
document. This standard has been available in the browser
for almost as long as Firefox has been released (since 2004),
and is also extremely popular; this standard’s most popular
feature, XMLHttpRequest.prototype.open, is used on 7,955
sites in the Alexa 10k. Standards in this portion of the
graph have been in the browser for a long time, and appear
on a large fraction of sites. This cluster of standards also
have generally low block rates of less than 50%, which are
considered low in this study.
Old, Unpopular Standards. Other standards, despite existing
in the browser nearly since Firefox’s inception, are much
less popular on the current web. Point H-P shows the
HTML: Plugins [22] standard, which is a subsection of the
larger HTML standard that allows document authors to
detect the names and capabilities of plugins installed in the
browser (such as Flash, Shockwave, Silverlight, etc.). The
most popular features of this standard have been available
in Firefox since 2005. However, the most popular feature
in this standard, namely, PluginArray.prototype.refresh,
which checks for changes in browser plugins, is used on less
than 1% of current websites (90 sites).
New, Popular Standards. Point SEL depicts the Selectors
API Level 1 [58] standard, which provides site authors with
a simpler interface for querying elements in a document.
Despite being a relatively recent addition to the browser (the
standard was added in 2013), the most popular feature in
the standard–the Document.prototype.querySelectorAll
feature–is used on over 80% of websites. This standard,
along with the other standards the Selectors API Level 1
standard is clustered with in the graph, have low block rates.
New, Unpopular Standards. Point V shows the Vibration [30]
standard, which allows site authors to trigger a vibration in
the user’s device on platforms that support it. Despite this
standard having been available in Firefox longer than the
previously mentioned Selectors API Level 1 standard, the Vi-
bration standard is significantly less popular on the web. The
sole method in the standard, Navigator.prototype.vibrate,
is only used once in the Alexa 10k.
5.7 Standard Blocking
Many users alter their browsing environment when vis-
iting websites. They may do so for a variety of reasons,
including wishing to limit advertising displayed on the pages
they read, reducing their exposure to malware distributed
through advertising networks, and increasing their privacy
by reducing the amount of tracking they experience online.
These browser modifications are typically made by installing
browser extensions.
We measured the effect that installing two common browser
extensions, AdBlock Plus and Ghostery, on the type and
number of features that are executed when visiting websites.
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Figure 7: Comparison of block rates of standards using
advertising vs. tracking blocking extensions.
5.7.1 Standard Blocking Frequency
As discussed in 5.4, browser standards are not equally
prevented from executing by installing blocking extensions.
As Figure 4 shows, some standards are greatly impacted by
installing these advertising and tracking blocking extensions,
while others are generally not impacted at all.
For example, the Beacon [20] standard, which allows web-
sites to trigger functionality when a user leaves a page, has
a 83.6% reduction in usage when browsing with blocking
extensions. Similarly, the SVG standard, which includes
functionality that allows for fingerprinting users through font
enumeration2, sees a similar 86.8% reduction in site usage
when browsing with blocking extensions.
Other browser standards, such as the core DOM standards,
see very little reduction in page usage in the presence of
blocking extensions.
5.7.2 Standard Blocking Purpose
In addition to measuring which standards were blocked by
extensions, we were also able to distinguish which extensions
did the blocking. Figure 7 plots the block rate of standards
when sites were visited with only an advertising blocking
extension installed (x-axis), versus the block rate of standards
when sites were visited with only a tacking blocking extension
installed (y-axis).
Values along the X=Y line in the graph are standards that
were blocked equally with both types of extensions installed,
with points closer to the upper-right corner being blocked
more often, and points closer to the lower-left corner being
blocked less often.
Points to the upper-left of the graph depict standards that
were blocked more frequently by the tracking-blocking ex-
tension than the advertising-blocking extension, while points
to the lower-right of the graph shows standards that were
blocked more frequently by the advertising-blocking exten-
sion.
As the graph shows, some standards, such as WebRTC [9]
2The SVGTextContentElement.prototype.
getComputedTextLength method
(which is associated with attacks revealing the user’s IP ad-
dress), WebCrypto API [25] (which is used by some analytics
libraries to generate identifying nonces), and Performance
Timeline Level 2 [18] (which is used to generate high resolu-
tion time stamps) are blocked by tracking-blocking extensions
more often than they are blocked by advertisement blocking
extensions.
The opposite is true, to a lesser extent, for the UI Events
Specification [19] standard, which specifies new ways that
sites can respond to user interactions.
5.8 Standards and Browser Vulnerabilities
Just as all browser standards are not equally popular
on the web, neither are all standards equally associated
with known vulnerabilities in Firefox. Some standards have
been associated with, or implicated in, a large number of
vulnerabilities, while others have not been associated with
any publicly known issues. This subsection presents which
browser standards have been connected to known security
vulnerabilities (in the form of filed CVEs), and the relative
popularity and block rates of those standards.
Column five of table 2 shows the number of CVEs associ-
ated with this standard’s implementation in Firefox within
the last three years. As the table shows, some implemen-
tations of web standards have been associated with a large
number of security bugs even though those standards are not
popular on the web or are frequently blocked by advertising
and tracking blocking extensions.
For example, the Web Audio API [4] standard is an ex-
ample of the first case; a standard that is highly unpopular
with website authors, but which has exposed users to a sub-
stantial number of security vulnerabilities. We observe the
standard in use on fewer that 2% of sites in our collection,
but its implementation in Firefox is associated with at least
10 CVEs in the last 3 years. WebRTC [9] is used on less
than 1% of sites in the Alexa 10k, but is associated with 8
CVEs in the last 3 years.
The Scalable Vector Graphics [13] standard is an example
of the latter case. The standard is very frequently blocked by
advertising and tracking blocking extensions; the standard is
used on 1,554 sites in the Alexa 10k, but is prevented from
executing in 87% of cases. At least 14 CVE’s have been
reported on Firefox’s implementation of the standard in the
last 3 years.
5.9 Site Complexity
Along with considering which standards are used by which
sites, we can also evaluate sites based on their complexity.
We define complexity as the number of standards used on a
given website. As Figure 8 shows, most sites use a reasonably
wide array of different standards: between 14 and 32 of the 74
available in the browser. No site used more than 41 different
standards, and a second mode exists around the zero mark,
showing that a small but measurable subset of sites use little
to no JavaScript at all.
6. VALIDATION
This study measures the features executed over repeated,
automated interactions with a website. We then treat these
automated measurements as representative of the features
that would be executed when a human visited the website.
Our work relies on the assumption that our automated
measurement technique triggers (at least) all the browser
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Figure 8: Probability density function of number of standards
used by sites in the Alexa 10k.
functionality a human user’s browser will execute when in-
teracting with the same website. This section explains how
we verified this assumption to be reasonable.
6.1 Internal Validation
Round # Avg. New Standards
2 1.56
3 0.40
4 0.29
5 0.00
Table 3: Average number of new standards encountered on
each subsequent automated crawl of a domain.
As discussed in Section 4.3.1, we applied our automated
measurement technique to each site in the Alexa 10k five
times. We measured five times with the goal of capturing the
full set of functionality used on the site, since the measure-
ment’s random walk technique means that each subsequent
measurement may encounter different parts of the site not
reached previously.
A natural question then is whether five measurements are
sufficient to capture all potentially encountered features per
site, or whether additional measurements are necessary. To
ensure that five measurements where sufficient, we examined
how many new standards were encountered on each round of
measurement. If new standards were still being encountered
in the final round of measurement, it would indicate we
had not measured enough, and that our data painted an
incomplete picture of the types of features used in each site.
Table 3 shows the results of this verification. The first col-
umn lists each round of measurement, and the second column
lists the corresponding number of new standards encountered
in the current round that had not yet been observed in the
previous rounds (averaged across the entire Alexa 10k). As
the table shows, the average number of new standards ob-
served on each site decreased with each measurement, until
the 5th measurement of each site, at which point we did not
Standard Name Abbreviation # Features # Sites Block Rate # CVEs
HTML: Canvas H-C 54 7,061 33.1% 15
Scalable Vector Graphics 1.1 (2nd Edition) SVG 138 1,554 86.8% 14
WebGL WEBGL 136 913 60.7% 13
HTML: Web Workers H-WW 2 952 59.9% 11
HTML 5 HTML5 69 7,077 26.2% 10
Web Audio API WEBA 52 157 81.1% 10
WebRTC 1.0 WRTC 28 30 29.2% 8
XMLHttpRequest AJAX 13 7,957 13.9% 8
DOM DOM 36 9,088 2.0% 4
Indexed Database API IDB 48 302 56.3% 3
Beacon BE 1 2,373 83.6% 2
Media Capture and Streams MCS 4 54 49.0% 2
Web Cryptography API WCR 14 7,113 67.8% 2
CSSOM View Module CSS-VM 28 4,833 19.0% 1
Fetch F 21 77 33.3% 1
Gamepad GP 1 3 0.0% 1
High Resolution Time, Level 2 HRT 1 5,769 50.2% 1
HTML: Web Sockets H-WS 2 544 64.6% 1
HTML: Plugins H-P 10 129 29.3% 1
Web Notifications WN 5 16 0.0% 1
Resource Timing RT 3 786 57.5% 1
Vibration API V 1 1 0.0% 1
Battery Status API BA 2 2,579 37.3% 0
CSS Conditional Rules Module, Level 3 CSS-CR 1 449 36.5% 0
CSS Font Loading Module, Level 3 CSS-FO 12 2,560 33.5% 0
CSS Object Model (CSSOM) CSS-OM 15 8,193 12.6% 0
DOM, Level 1 - Specification DOM1 47 9,139 1.8% 0
DOM, Level 2 - Core Specification DOM2-C 31 8,951 3.0% 0
DOM, Level 2 - Events Specification DOM2-E 7 9,077 2.7% 0
DOM, Level 2 - HTML Specification DOM2-H 11 9,003 4.5% 0
DOM, Level 2 - Style Specification DOM2-S 19 8,835 4.3% 0
DOM, Level 2 - Traversal and Range Specification DOM2-T 36 4,590 33.4% 0
DOM, Level 3 - Core Specification DOM3-C 10 8,495 3.9% 0
DOM, Level 3 - XPath Specification DOM3-X 9 381 79.1% 0
DOM Parsing and Serialization DOM-PS 3 2,922 60.7% 0
execCommand EC 12 2,730 24.0% 0
File API FA 9 1,991 58.0% 0
Fullscreen API FULL 9 383 79.9% 0
Geolocation API GEO 4 174 13.1% 0
HTML: Channel Messaging H-CM 4 5,018 77.4% 0
HTML: Web Storage H-WS 8 7,875 29.2% 0
HTML HTML 195 8,980 4.3% 0
HTML: History Interface H-HI 6 1,729 18.7% 0
Media Source Extensions MSE 8 1,616 37.5% 0
Performance Timeline PT 2 4,690 75.8% 0
Performance Timeline, Level 2 PT2 1 1,728 93.7% 0
Selection API SEL 14 2,575 36.6% 0
Selectors API, Level 1 SLC 6 8,674 7.7% 0
Timing control for script-based animations TC 1 3,568 76.9% 0
UI Events Specification UIE 8 1,137 56.8% 0
User Timing, Level 2 UTL 4 3,325 33.7% 0
DOM4 DOM4 3 5,747 37.6% 0
Non-Standard NS 65 8,669 24.5% 0
Table 2: Popularity and blockrate for the web standards that are used on at least 1% of the Alexa 10k or have at least one
associated CVE advisory in the last three years.
Columns one and two list the name and abbreviation of the standard.
Column three gives the number of features (methods and properties) from that standard that we were able to instrument.
Column four includes the number of pages that used at least one feature from the standard, out of the entire Alexa 10k.
Column five shows the number of sites on which no features in the standard executed in the presence of advertising and
tracking blocking extensions (given that the website executed at least one feature from the standard in the default case),
divided by the number of pages where at least one feature from the standard was executed. In other words, how often the
blocking extensions prevented all features in a standard from executing, given at least one feature would have been used.
Column six shows the number of CVEs associated with this standard’s implementation in Firefox within the last three years.
observe any new features being executed on any site.
From this we concluded that 5 rounds was a sufficient
number of measurements for each domain, and that further
automated measurements of these sites were unlikely to
observe new feature usage.
6.2 External Validation
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Figure 9: Average number of new standards encountered on
each subsequent automated crawl of a domain.
We also tested whether our automated technique observes
the same set of functionalities as a human web user. We
chose 100 sites to visit randomly, but weighted each choice
according to the proportion of visits that site gets according
to Alexa. We continued to select sites until we had collected
a set of 100 different sites. We interacted with each site for
90 seconds in a casual web browsing fashion. This included
reading articles and blog posts, scrolling through websites,
browsing site navigation listings, etc. We interacted with
the home page of the site (the page directed to from the raw
domain) for 30 seconds, then clicked on a prominent link we
thought a typical human browser would also choose (such
as the headline of a featured article) and interacted with
this second page for 30 more seconds. We then repeated the
process a third time, loading a third page that was interacted
with for another 30 seconds.
After omitting pornographic and non-English sites, We
were able to complete this process for 92 different websites.
We then compared the features used during manual interac-
tion with our automated measurements of the same domains.
Figure 9 provides a histogram of this comparison, with the
x-axis showing the number of new standards observed dur-
ing manual interaction that were not observed during the
automated interaction. As the graph shows, in the majority
of cases (83.7%), no new features were observed during man-
ual interaction that the automated measurements did not
catch. The graph also shows a few outliers, including one
very significant outlier, where manual interaction triggered
standards that our automated technique did not.
From this we conclude that our automated measurement
technique did a generally accurate job of emulating the kinds
of feature use a human user would encounter on the web, even
if the technique does not perfectly capture human feature
usage in all cases.
7. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the potential ramifications of
these findings, including what our results mean for the com-
plexity of the browser.
7.1 Popular and Unpopular Browser Features
There are a small number of standards in the browser
that are extremely popular with website authors, providing
features which can be thought of as necessary for making
modern web pages usable. These standards provide function-
ality like querying the document for elements, inspecting and
validating forms, and making client-side page modifications.3.
A much larger portion of the browser’s functionality, how-
ever, is unused by most site authors. Eleven different JavaScript-
exposed standards in Firefox are completely unused in the
top ten thousand most popular websites, and 28 (nearly 37%
of standards available in the browser) are used by less than
1% of sites.
While many unpopular features are relatively new to the
browser, youth alone does not seem to explain the extreme
unpopularity of most features in the browser on the open
web. These lesser used features may be of interest only for
those creating applications which require login, or only small
niches of developers and site visitors.
7.2 Blocked Browser Features
When users employ common advertising and tracking
blocking extensions, they further reduce the frequency and
number of standards that are executed in their browser. This
suggests that some standards are primarily used to support
the advertising and tracking infrastructure built into the
modern web. When users browse with these common exten-
sions installed, four additional standards go unused on the
web (a total of 15 standards, or 20% of those available in
the browser). An additional 20 standards become used on
less than 1% of websites (for a total of 31 standards, or 41%
of standards in the browser). 16 standards are blocked over
75% of the time by blocking extensions.
Furthermore, while content blocker rules do not target
JavaScript APIs directly, that a standard like SVG [13], used
on 16% of the Alexa 10k, would be prevented from running
87% of the time is circumstantial evidence that whatever
website functionality this enables is not necessary to the
millions of people who use content blocking extensions. This
phenomenon lends credence to what has been called “the
Website Obesity Crisis” - the conjecture that websites include
far more functionality than is actually necessary to serve the
user’s purpose [12].
The presence of a large amount of unused functionality
in the browser seems to contradict the common security
principal of least privilege, or of giving applications only the
capabilities they need to accomplish their intended task, and
no more. This principal exists to limit attack surface and
limit the unforeseen security risks that can come from the
unexpected, and unintended, composition of features. As
the list of CVEs in Figure 2 shows, unpopular and heavily
blocked features have imposed substantial security costs to
the browser.
Even though these features are frequently blocked, the sites
that they are blocked on are among the most popular websites
3All of which are covered by the Document Object Model
(DOM) Level 1 Specification standard, dating back to 1998.
in the world. That these sites remain both functional and
popular after having so much of their functionality removed
speaks to the robustness of the web programming model, that
these sites can still deliver the user’s desired functionality
even after being heavily modified.
7.3 Future Work
This study develops and validates the use of monkey testing
to elicit browser feature usage on the open web. The closed
web (i.e. web content and functionality that are only available
after logging in to a website) likely uses a broader set of
features. With the correct credentials, the monkey testing
approach could be used to evaluate those sites, although it
would likely need to be improved with an increased crawl
depth or a rudimentary understanding of site semantics.
Finally, a more complete treatment of the security implica-
tions of these broad APIs would be valuable. In recent years,
plugins like Java and Flash have become less popular, and the
native capabilities of browsers have become more impressive.
The modern browser is a monolithic intermediary between
web applications and user hardware, like an operating sys-
tem. For privacy conscious users or those with special needs
(like on public kiosks, or electronic medical record readers),
understanding the privacy and security implications of this
broad attack surface is very important.
8. CONCLUSION
The Web API offers a standardized API for programming
across operating systems and web browsers. This platform
has been tremendously useful in the proliferation of the web
as a platform for both content dissemination and applica-
tion distribution, and has enabled the modern web, built
on JavaScript and offering functionality like video, games,
and productivity applications. Applications that were once
only possible as native apps or external plugins are now
implemented in JavaScript in the browser.
With this move of the web from a content distribution
system to an application platform, more browser features
have been added, not only support these applications, but
support them across the incredible range of devices we use
to access the web. Given this, it is not surprising that some
features implemented within the browser are infrequently
used.
Beyond this popularity divide, however, is the segment of
features which are blocked by content blockers in the vast
majority of attempted uses. Although consumers are not
directly rejecting those features as complicit with ads or
tracking, the mere fact that these features are simultaneously
popular with site authors but overwhelmingly blocked by site
users signals that these features may exist in the browser to
serve the needs of the site author rather than the site visitor.
That these features can even be blocked at all, however,
speaks to the robustness of the web’s open standards and
extensible user agents. Preventing such functionality in
native applications is far less common and likely more difficult.
As the role of browser and the web continues to grow, the
ability of web users to customize their experience will likely
remain an important aspect of keeping the web user-centric,
vibrant, and successful.
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